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THE THREAT  of  a  "financial  crisis"  may  have  motivated  the  Federal 
Reserve Board's apparent  decision to relax  monetary  policy earlier  this 
year. Such crises have been a recurrent  theme since the mid-1960s, 
although  definition  of the term and prediction  of the event have proved 
equally elusive. Corporate  bankruptcies,  failures  in the thrift  industry, 
problems at regional banks, and near-defaults on loans to foreign 
borrowers  have created  new concerns  about  the  resiliency  of the  financial 
structure. The concerns are especially great because of the linkages 
between the health of the financial system and the growth of real 
economic activity. 
In this paper I propose to differentiate  between the ebb and flow of 
the business cycle on the one hand, and events triggered  by financial 
market weaknesses on the other. In that context, I evaluate recent 
experience in domestic and international  financial  markets.  My conclu- 
sion is that the current episode qualifies as a full-fledged  crisis of a 
magnitude  comparable  to the 1974-75  experience.  The Federal  Reserve 
is seen to play crucial  roles both  in the development  and  in the resolution 
of past and  present crises. 
Definition 
Analysts have used the term "financial  crisis" (or a variant  such as 
"liquidity  crisis") to describe  a variety  of phenomena  differing  primarily 
in the degree  of distress that  is implied.  Hyman  Minsky  has emphasized 
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the potential  instability  of the credit system.' He has in mind a forced 
liquidation  of assets, occasioned by an inability  to raise cash through 
more  conventional  means,  which  precipitates  a sharp  drop  in  asset prices 
and  leads inevitably  to a depression.2 
Allen Sinai and others describe a cyclical "crunch  period" as a less 
severe but more common type of financial  event.3  These are episodes 
that begin during  an economic expansion with an intensifying  squeeze 
on liquidity. Monetary  policy is restrictive. The ensuing high level of 
interest rates or credit rationing  causes businesses and consumers to 
curtail  their  spending  plans, and  eventually  a recession  ensues. Reduced 
demand  then permits  rates to fall, and  the episode ends. 
The important  distinction  between the Minsky  and Sinai  phenomena 
is the manner  in  which  the stress  is resolved  through  a shift  of the burdens 
from  the financial  markets  to the real sector. In the Minsky  formulation, 
pressures increase until the financial  markets  break  down, and this in 
turn triggers  depression in the real sector. In a Sinai crunch, financial 
stringency is continuously transmitted  to the real economy, so the 
recession occurs without  sudden  disruptions  in financial  markets  and is 
consequently  milder. 
Financial  crises, as the term  is to be used here, differ  from  either  the 
Minsky or Sinai phenomena.  The former  almost never occurs and the 
latter is observed during  every period of tight money. Here I consider 
and  characterize  an  important  intermediate  case. At any  time,  a borrower 
may confront a rise in the risk premium  lenders demand  for reasons 
related  to the borrower's  real  economic  position. In a financial  crisis, by 
contrast, some borrowers  face a premium  arising  from financial  devel- 
opments elsewhere that are unrelated  to their own outlook. Such an 
excess premium  can take the form  of exceptionally  high  interest  rates  or 
of credit  rationing  that  effectively precludes  borrowing. 
Borrowers confronting  traditional  risk premiums  can be said to be 
paying  the socially  appropriate  interest  rate  given  their  situation,  whereas 
1. See Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics,  and Crashes: A Histoty of Fintancial 
Crises (Basic Books,  1978), pp. 3-24. 
2.  Hyman P. Minsky,  "A Theory  of Systemic  Fragility,"  in Edward I. Altman and 
Arnold W. Sametz,  eds.,  Financial  Crises: Institutions and Markets in a Fragile Environ- 
ment (Wiley,  1977), pp. 139-40. 
3.  Allen Sinai, "Credit Crunches-An  Analysis  of the Postwar Experience,"  in Otto 
Eckstein,  ed., Parameters  and Policies  in the U.S. Economy,  Data Resources Series, vol. 
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borrowers  faced with an excess premium  are paying rates that reflect 
general  financial  disruptions  but  not their  own economic  prospects.  Such 
effects can precipitate solvency and liquidity  problems that originate 
with the excessive cost of funds. A firm in this position will reduce 
planned  capital  spending  and  output  more  than  its real  economic  situation 
warrants.  In turn, this will adversely affect employees and suppliers, 
spreading  problems  to other sectors. In the extreme, otherwise  healthy 
firms  could  fail as bad  news about  unrelated  firms  raised  borrowing  costs 
and  reduced  economy-wide  sales and  output. 
PENN  CENTRAL 
The bankruptcy  of the Penn Central  Transportation  Company  is a 
well-known case that can illuminate  these distinctions.4  In June 1970 
Penn Central  had $200 million in commercial  paper outstanding.  The 
company  had  just recorded  a $63 million  first-quarter  loss and its bank 
credit  lines were exhausted.  When  a last-minute  effort  to secure  govern- 
ment loan guarantees  failed, Penn Central  went into default. 
What followed is subject to varying  interpretations.  Some consider 
the Penn Central  episode to have been a serious crisis while others do 
not.5 A few companies, notably Chrysler Financial Corporation  and 
Commercial Credit Corporation, were virtually unable to roll over 
maturing commercial paper. Total paper outstanding  fell $7 billion 
between May 1970  and year-end. Banks were able to take up some of 
the slack: total bank loans increased by $13 billion over the period as 
jumbo certificates  of deposit outstanding  rose by $12  billion  in 1970:3. 
In anticipation  of ripple  effects, the Federal  Reserve  had  made  known 
its willingness  to lend to banks through  the discount window, and rate 
ceilings were removed on short-term  jumbo CDs. As the Penn Central 
situation  unfolded, bank  borrowings  from  the Federal  Reserve climbed 
steadily  from  $748  million  in the week before  the default  to $1.8 billion  a 
month  later. The markets  having  remained  reasonably  calm, discounts 
and  advances  declined  to less than  $700  million  by the end  of the summer. 
4.  This  example  has  been  widely  cited.  See,  for  example,  Thomas  M.  Timlen, 
"Commercial Paper-Penn  Central and Others,"  in Altman and Sametz, eds.,  Financial 
Crises, pp. 220-25;  and Albert M. Wojnilower,  "The Central Roie of Credit Crunches in 
Recent Financial History,"  BPEA, 2:1980, pp. 292-94. 
5.  See Wojnilower, "Credit Crunches,"  p. 293; and Economic Report of the President, 
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Thus the problems  seem to have been confined  to a relatively  few- 
albeit large-companies.  Interest rates on commercial  paper of nonfi- 
nancial  corporations  moved up a few basis points in July 1970  as other 
market  rates drifted  lower, but preexisting  spreads  were reestablished 
the  following  month.  Rates  on finance  paper  initially  showed  a somewhat 
larger  bulge, but by the end of the year, normal spreads were being 
restored.  The banks that took up the loan demand  of corporations  that 
had been foreclosed from the paper market  were likewise unaffected: 
CD rates also fell continuously  through  the second half of 1970,  despite 
the lifting  of regulation  Q ceilings  and  the presumed  riskiness  of the new 
loans. A fairly substantial  shift in the composition  of assets was accom- 
plished  with virtually  no disruption. 
The difficulties  of Chrysler  Financial,  Commercial  Credit,  and  others 
may be traced  to conditions  peculiar  to those firms  and  not to the overall 
financial  situation.  Before the Penn Central  default  the market  may not 
have  adequately  assessed theirriskiness,  while  afterward  the  appropriate 
risk premiums  were demanded.  The 1969-70 period was not a serious 
crisis. 
OPEC  I  AND  FRANKLIN  NATIONAL  BANK 
Some have suggested  that  the 1974-75  period  was a major  crisis.6  The 
Arab oil embargo in the fall of  1973 had put severe strains on the 
economy. Rates on bank  jumbo CDs  jumped sharply  in the first  months 
of the embargo  but then settled back to a normal  spread  over Treasury 
bills in the first  quarter  of 1974  (see table 1). 
But then Franklin  National Bank of New York, one of the nation's 
largest, failed in May 1974, followed by the Herstatt Bank failure in 
Cologne, Germany, and the problems of the Real Estate Investment 
Trusts  connected with many  banks.  Renewed  doubts  about  the safety of 
the banking  system led to a large increase in rates on CDs relative to 
Treasury  bills. The spread  rose from  an average  of 45 basis points  in the 
late 1960s  and early 1970s  to nearly  300  basis points  by mid-1974,  a level 
that  has yet to be equaled.  (The  Treasury  bill  rate  was itself rising  during 
this period.)  The spread  peaked  briefly  at 470 basis points in July 1974. 
6.  "Are Credit Crunches Predictable?" Economic Research (Goldman Sachs, Septem- 
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Table 1.  Interest Rate Differentials between Bank CDs and Treasury Bills, 
Selected Periods,  1965-79 
Percentage  points 
Jumbo CD rate less 
three-month  Treasury 
bill yielda 
Standard 
Episode  Period or quarter  Mean  deviation 
1965:1-1969:4  0.45  0.32 
Penn Central  1970:1  1.07 
2  1OO0b 
3  0.87  ... 
4  0.57 
1971:1-1973:2  0.45  0.19 
Oil embargo  1973:3  1.72 
4  1.35 
1974:1  0.35 
Franklin National  1974:2  2.95 
3  2.99 
4.  1.64 
1975:1-1979:4  0.27  0.26 
Source:  Author's calculations  based on Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  Banking and Monetary 
Statistics,  1941-1970  (1976) and Annual Statistical  Digest,  1970-1979  (1981). 
a.  Last  month  of  quarter. The jumbo  CD  rate is  the three-month  discount  rate for certificates  of deposit  in the 
secondary  market converted  to investment  yield. 
b.  Rate ceiling  removed  June  1970. 
The conventional wisdom is that only the largest and most credit- 
worthy  banks  were able to roll  over maturing  CDs, and  that  this inability 
to raise  funds  caused  a reduction  in  new  loan  commitments  and  intensified 
the ensuing recession. Yet the volume of jumbo CDs outstanding  rose 
by $76 billion at a seasonally adjusted  annual  rate in 1974:2  and by $46 
billion  in 1974:3,  compared  with much smaller  amounts  in the preceding 
quarters.  Net new bank  lending  continued  to be positive through  1974:4. 
As the shocks of the Franklin  National collapse were beginning  to be 
felt, the Federal Reserve was once again  called upon to step in. Banks 
managed  to retain deposits on their own, however, by offering  higher 
premiums  on jumbo CDs. Nearly all of the $2.1 billion increase in 
discount-window  borrowing  between 1974:1  and 1974:3  went  to Franklin 400  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
National itself. Advances to Franklin National were $1.7 billion on 
October 8,  1974, when that obligation was assumed by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation  (FDIC). By year-end, total advances 
were well below the precrisis  level. 
The increased  cost of funds to banks  was passed through  in the form 
of higher  lending  rates. The prime  rate rose from  8/4 percent  before  the 
Franklin  National crisis to 12 percent shortly  after, roughly  paralleling 
the change in the CD rate. For the prime rate this level represented  a 
record  spread  over Treasury  yields that  was surpassed  only when credit 
controls  were imposed  in 1980. 
Clearly the entire banking system did not become much riskier in 
those few  months. Nor does it seem plausible that investors were 
underestimating  the risks to that great an extent before mid-1974. 
Moreover,  yields retreated  and spreads  narrowed  rapidly  within  a year. 
The aberration  appears  to have arisen from events within  the financial 
system, and has the characteristics  of a serious crisis as defined  here. 
Corporations  whose borrowing  was linked to the prime rate paid pre- 
miums  that had more to do with perceived risks in the banking  system 
than  with themselves. And, although  the duration  of the crisis  was brief, 
these were real costs that contributed  to reduced  earnings  and  curtailed 
capital  spending. 
A major  financial  disruption  more severe than anything  experienced 
in the last thirty-five  years would seem to require  not only the precon- 
ditions of a crisis, but also lack of confidence  by investors  bordering  on 
panic and an inability  or unwillingness  by the central  bank  to intervene 
effectively. These further conditions seem unlikely to be  satisfied. 
Markets  remained  orderly  during  the two episodes described  above, as 
indicated by the continuing  volume of transactions. Moreover, there 
was every indication that the Federal Reserve was prepared  for the 
problems  that  arose. 
Present Financial Risks 
The current  period clearly qualifies  as at least a financial  crunch of 
the sort described by Sinai. Economic expansion has ended with the 
application of tight monetary policy.  High real interest rates have 
combined  with lower levels of real demand  to cause serious cash-flow 
problems  for businesses in several sectors. Andrew S.  Carron  401 
The household sector has suffered  declines in real income and a rise 
in unemployment.  Spending  has been curtailed,  and loan repayments 
are beginning  to lag. Although consumer loan delinquencies  have re- 
mained  level, recent experience with mortgage  loans is less favorable. 
As of mid-1982,  mortgage  delinquencies  as a share  of loans outstanding 
were 60 percent above 1979  levels and foreclosures  were up more than 
40 percent.7  Interest  income of financial  corporations  has been impaired 
somewhat  as a result. 
These trends have been cited as the incipience  of a serious financial 
crisis. One cannot minimize the  substantial dislocations that have 
occurred to corporations, households, and sovereign borrowers  and, 
indirectly,  to the banking  system. Indeed,  the repercussions  on financial 
institutions  may well represent  the more serious set of problems. 
The balance of this paper reviews conditions  in several areas of the 
economy and argues that the financial system moved to the level of 
nascent crisis at some point in 1982. Evidence of crisis conditions are 
described and distinguished from other indicators of palpable, but 
nonfinancial,  stress. The section concludes  with  a brief  discussion  of the 
role  of the Federal  Reserve System in preventing  or ameliorating  present 
financial  crises. 
NONFINANCIAL  CORPORATE  BUSINESS 
The corporate sector is undergoing  severe financial  strains, but for 
the most part they are the result of depressed sales and lingering  cost 
pressures.  Through  midyear,  pre-tax  profits  of nonfinancial  corporations 
have fallen by a third from their peak in the first quarter of  1981. 
Business failures have risen, in relative as well as absolute terms, to 
levels that rival the 1930-33 period. Real gross domestic product of 
nonfinancial  corporations  fell to an annual  rate of $859  billion  in 1982:1 
from  $883  billion  a year earlier. 
Because of high  long-term  interest  rates, there  has been a pronounced 
shift to short-term  financing,  leading  to a greater  sensitivity to market 
shocks. The "quick  ratio" (financial  assets to short-term  liabilities)  is at 
a historic low of 1.15, and short-term  liabilities  are 71 percent of total 
liabilities.  These levels, however, have not changed very much in the 
7.  Mortgage Bankers Association  of America,  "National  Delinquency  Survey"  (Au- 
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last two years. So, although  interest  payments  consumed  39 percent  of 
sector domestic income less  employee compensation in  1982:2, an 
increase of 9 percent from a year earlier, substantial  cash flow is still 
available  to meet contractual  obligations.  These are aggregate  data, of 
course, and many  firms  are in a much  more  tenuous  position. But many 
types of spending  can be and  have been deferred.  One  cost of the current 
episode has thus been a loss  of  output arising from a diminished 
inclination  to incur  risks on the part  of both borrowers  and  lenders.  This 
is a manifestation  of a crisis. 
If corporate bankruptcies  induce lenders to raise risk premiums,  it 
may be a sign that new information  has reached  the market  and proper 
allocative decisions are being made. For example, during  1982,  ratings 
of many  corporate  bond  issuers  were reduced.  In 1981  Moody's  lowered 
ratings  on fifty-three  companies and raised them on thirty-three.  As of 
September  30, 1982,  the annualized  rates have been one hundred  forty- 
four  downgradings versus  fifty-two upgradings.8  The  mark of  a 
crisis, however, would be higher risk premiums  for bonds of healthy 
companies of a given quality-a  widening  of spreads  between rates on 
corporate and Treasury bonds, for example. That would imply an 
increase in risk aversion, with risk premiums  in excess of that required 
for actuarial soundness. Improper  allocative decisions would result. 
Corporations  that would have prospered, or at least survived, at the 
former  lower level of rates (which  they have merited)  find  themselves  in 
greater  difficulty  when confronted  with higher  rates, thereby fulfilling 
the prophecy. 
Bond  rates  for firms  with  less than  the highest  credit  ratings  have risen 
to stiff premiums  over comparable  issues of higher-rated  corporations 
and  the federal  government,  as shown  in table  2. It is interesting  that  the 
spread  of the Aaa rate  over long-term  Treasury  bonds  has declined  even 
as the Baa-Aaa spread has widened over the past several years. This 
may suggest  a relative scarcity  of the higher-rated  issues as institutional 
investors seek to abide by rules prescribing  some minimum  percentage 
of those securities regardless of yield differences. This widening of 
spreads  for lower-grade  issuers is imposing  costs on new issuers. It is 
true  that  the flow of new long-term  bonds is small-Baa  companies  now 
account for about 10 percent of new issues, and bonds represent  less 
8.  Data provided by Moody's  Investors Service,  Incorporated. Andrew S.  Carron  403 
Table 2.  Interest Rate Differentials on Corporate Bonds, Selected Periods, 1965 through 
1982:3 
Percentage points 
Long-term  interest rate spreadsa 
Moody's  corporate Aaa  less  Moody's  corporate Baa  less 
ten-year  Treasury  corporate Aaa 
Standard  Standard 
Period or quarter  Mean  deviation  Mean  deviation 
1965:1-1969:4  0.33  0.18  0.65  0.18 
1970:1-1972:2  1.09  0.28  1.10  0.21 
1972:3-1974:2  0.95  0.31  0.80  0.11 
1974:3-1975:2  1.13  0.22  1.59  0.37 
1975:3-1979:4  0.52  0.26  1.09  0.31 
1980:  1-1982:3  0.44  0.20  2.01  0.35 
1980:1  0.21  .  .  .  1.49  ... 
2  0.80  .  .  .  2.13  ... 
3  0.51  ...  1.68  ... 
4  0.37  .  .  .  1.93  ... 
1981:1  0.21  .  .  .  2.01  .  .  . 
2  0.28  .  .  .  2.05  ... 
3  0.17  .  .  .  1.43  ... 
4  0.51  ...  2.32  ... 
1982:1  0.72  .  .  .  2.24  ... 
2  0.51  .  .  .  2.11  ... 
3  0.60  .  .  .  2.69  ... 
Source:  Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System. 
a.  Last month of quarter. 
than  25 percent of new funds raised.9  Yet these yield differentials  carry 
over into the commercial  paper  and  bank  loan markets  as well (although 
the spreads  there are not so wide). So all corporations  with lower credit 
ratings  and a continuing  need for new financing  are facing higher  risk 
premiums  than  before. 
As in the 1970  and 1974  episodes, some firms  have had their ratings 
lowered, but spreads  are widening  even between  bonds  of a presumably 
constant quality. Partly that is because the rating  agencies apparently 
adjust  ratings  only when an issuer improves  or deteriorates  relative to 
the market, and not when market  risk itself changes. To that extent, 
higher risk premiums  are the result of real-sector events and are not 
9.  "Credit Difficulties: A Need for Perspective,"  The Morgan Guaranty Survey (June 
1982), p.  3; and Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  Flow  of Funds 
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products  of the financial  system. The yield spread  on Aaa  bonds  is above 
recent  levels although  still narrower  than  during  the 1970-75  period.  For 
bonds with lower rates, however, the spread is at an all-time high.'0 
These are further indications of "crisis" as defined in the previous 
section. 
MONEY  MARKET  MUTUAL  FUNDS 
Money market mutual funds are a relatively new instrument,  but 
already they have enormous importance. Total shares outstanding 
reached  $225  billion  at the end of the third  quarter  of 1982,  of which  $181 
billion was in noninstitutional  funds.11  These accounts have grown 
extremely rapidly  since 1979  and represent  a major  shift in the compo- 
sition  of household  financial  assets. For many, they have substituted  for 
time and savings deposits (and, to a lesser extent, checkable  deposits). 
The current  crunch is the first to be encountered  by the money funds, 
and  it therefore  seems appropriate  to examine  this industry's  reaction  to 
stress. 
So far both managers  and customers  have prospered.  Money market 
mutual  funds enjoy an image of safety rivaling  the insured  depository 
institutions  while they champion  the cause of the small saver. But the 
very popularity  of the funds-particularly to relatively  unsophisticated 
investors-has  raised  questions:  given the ease of withdrawals,  the lack 
of deposit insurance,  and their  high visibility, is a "run" on the money 
funds possible? How likely is this to occur and what would the ramifi- 
cations be? 
One  key indicator  is the ability  of a money  fund's  managers  to maintain 
constant the net asset value of a share. This is accomplished  through 
adroit  control  of default  and interest  rate  risks. 
The potential impact of defaults is minimized  by purchasing  high- 
quality assets  from diverse issuers.  Funds typically have rigorous 
standards  in these areas, selecting issues only from among  the highest 
grades and avoiding undue concentration  in a single issuer. Even if a 
10.  For  a  more  extensive  discussion  of  risk  premiums  see  "Credit  Difficulties," 
pp. 2-3. 
11.  Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System,  Feder-al Reserve  Statistical 
Release  H.6,  "Money  Stock Measures and Liquid Assets"  (October 8, 1982), p. 4. Andrew  S.  Carron  405 
Table 3.  Composition of Money Market Mutual Fund Assets, 
1979 through first half of 1982 
Shares of total in percent except  as specified 
Net purchases  Outstandinga 
First 
half, 
Type of asset  1979  1980  1981  1982  1979:4  1980:4  1981:4  1982:2 
Certificates 
of deposit  22  31  21  6  26  28  24  22 
U.S.  government 
and agency 
securities  12  9  22  19  12  11  18  18 
Open market paper  45  42  36  40  43  42  39  39 
Foreign deposits  13  6  11  17  11  9  10  11 
All other  8  12  10  18  8  10  9  10 
Total (billions 
of dollars)  34.4  29.2  107.5  39.7b  45.2  74.4  181.9  201.8 
Source': Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  Flowv of  Funtids  Accountits, Second  Quiarter 1982 
(September  1982). 
a.  Outstanding at end of period shown. 
b.  At an annual rate. Quarterly data as published are not seasonally  adjusted. 
default  were to occur, it could be covered by earnings  without  affecting 
the share  price. 
Interest rate risk is minimized  by the short  maturities  on assets that 
fund  managers  maintain  as a matter  of choice and  as a result  of Securities 
and Exchange Commission  rules. The commission also audits money 
market  mutual  funds more  frequently  than  other  types of mutual  funds. 
The money market  funds  themselves  have sought  to address  the issue 
of safety. Many  new  funds  invest  only  in securites  of the U. S. government 
and agencies. In the first  quarter  of 1982,  these issues accounted  for 38 
percent of net purchases, up from 22 percent in 1981  and 9 percent in 
1980.12  Bank  CDs have  fallen  out of favor, as the funds  have substantially 
reduced  their  new purchases  of these instruments  in 1982.  The changing 
portfolio composition of  money market mutual funds is  shown in 
table  3. 
Is there an impact  on money markets  from  changes  in the investment 
attitudes  of money fund managers?  It may be that money funds seek to 
preserve  their  image  by quickly  and  visibly shifting  purchases  in accord- 
12.  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  Flow of Funds Accounts. 406  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
ance  with  perceived  preferences  and  not  necessarily  in  response  to actual 
changes in risk and return. For example, it has been reported  that the 
money  funds  stopped  purchasing  CDs  from  Continental  Illinois  National 
Bank  and  Trust  Company  of Chicago  after  its losses in the Penn Square 
Bank  episode came to light, even though  other investors  (notably  other 
banks and overseas investors) continued to buy Continental  Bank's 
paper  at a small  premium.  '3 
Commercial  paper  (including  finance  paper  and  bankers'  acceptances) 
has always represented  the largest  single  type of asset in money market 
mutual fund portfolios, with the share hovering around 40 percent. 
Indeed, the funds have become the largest purchasers  of this paper, 
absorbing  72 percent of the net increase in 1981, as shown in table 4. 
Much of the growth in money fund holdings  of commercial  paper has 
paralleled a decline in household purchases, suggesting that many 
investors have simply shifted  from direct  purchases  to use of the funds 
as intermediaries.  Money funds plus households held 41 percent of 
commercial  paper outstanding  at the end of 1979  and hold 49 percent 
currently,  although  total paper  outstanding  grew  during  the period  from 
$156 billion to $247 billion. Net new issues fell to a $31 billion annual 
rate  in the first  half of 1982,  but because of the short  maturities  on these 
instruments  (generally  less than  six months),  the stock  turns  over several 
times a year. 
Now that  32 percent  of outstanding  paper  is held  by investors  through 
money market  mutual  funds, does the intermediation  process increase 
or decrease the chances of a crisis? Fewer individuals  now control the 
decisions to roll over a larger  share  of outstanding  paper,  and  they must 
meet the concerns of investors who can demand  immediate  redemption 
of shares. The secondary market for commercial paper is less well 
developed than for other money fund assets such as government  secu- 
rities and negotiable  CDs. A decision by a few fund managers  to invest 
elsewhere the proceeds  from  maturing  open market  paper  could  quickly 
spread  to other funds. Such actions could introduce  substantial  short- 
run disruptions as corporations seek alternative  purchasers  for their 
paper  or different  sources of financing. 
The dollars  taken  out of paper  would still  be available  for investment, 
either by money market mutual funds or by individual  investors. A 
13.  Wall Street Journal, August  10, 1982. Andrew  S.  Carron  407 
Table 4.  Holders of Open Market Paper,  1979 through first half of 1982a 
Shares of total in percent except  as specified 
Net purchases  Outstandingb 
First 
half, 
Holder of shares  1979  1980  1981  1982  1979:4  1980:4  1981:4  1982:2 
Money market 
mutual funds  39  57  72  52  12  18  30  32 
Households  20  -  10  3  - 11  29  24  19  17 
Nonfinancial 
corporations, 
business  and 
foreign  27  15  5  34  38  35  28  28 
Commercial banks  5  8  1  -8  10  10  8  7 
All other  9  30  19  33  1  1  13  15  16 
Total (billions 
of dollars)  40.3  21.6  54.0  30.5c  156.4  178.0  232.0  247.3 
Source'  Same as table 3. 
a.  Commercial paper and bankers' acceptances. 
b.  Outstanding at end of period shown. 
c.  At a seasonally  adjusted annual rate. 
decision by the holders  of funds to shift  from  commercial  paper  to bank 
certificates,  for example, would permit  a substitution  by borrowers  of 
bank  loans for paper  issues. The Federal  Reserve would have to adjust 
reserves to accommodate  this shift  into reservable  instruments,  and  the 
adjustment  by borrowers  and lenders would not be instantaneous,  so 
some costs  would be incurred. But none of this poses any special 
problems  for financial  markets  or for the Federal  Reserve. 
Unlike the nonfinancial  corporate  sector and the depository  institu- 
tions  to be discussed  subsequently,  there  are  no signs  of trouble  stemming 
from the money market  mutual  funds. In principle,  the potential  does 
exist,  however, and emerging data may indicate that money fund 
investment  decisions tend  to amplify  the distortions  that  arise  elsewhere 
in the system. 
THRIFT  INSTITUTIONS 
Depository  institutions  may be the locus of problems  in a crisis. The 
question  is whether the difficulties  of some banks or thrift  institutions 
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not similarly  afflicted.  A bank  or thrift  institution  that  finds  it must  pay a 
premium  for new funds will curtail new lending. In that event, other 
institutions  would pick up the deposits and may be able to provide  the 
funds. But the borrower  denied new credit  at one bank  due to a lack of 
funds may have difficulty  arranging  credit elsewhere. So the problems 
of banks  can affect corporate  spending  decisions. Bank  failures  through 
the first three quarters  of 1982  were triple  the number  for the full year 
1981,  and  thrift  industry  failures  are at record  high  levels.14 
Until 1982  most problems  of depository  institutions  (like those of the 
real sector) flowed from general economic conditions and not from 
situations  arising  within  the financial  sector. A bank  that  fails because it 
has made imprudent  (or unlucky)  loan decisions is not the victim of a 
crisis. Nor is a thrift  institution  that becomes insolvent  as the result  of a 
portfolio maturity imbalance with rising market interest rates. In a 
crunch,  poorly  managed  institutions  fail. A crisis occurs  if efficient  firms 
are pulled  down because of reactions  to the inefficient  firms. 
In the current  financial  crunch, unprecedented  numbers  of savings 
institutions have failed, although the ripple effects have so far been 
comparatively  small. Doubt has been cast on the reliability  of federal 
deposit  insurance.  Major  changes  have occurred  in the retail  deposit  and 
mortgage  loan markets,  adding  to the fragility  of the system. 
Thrift institutions continue to experience deposit outflows, partly 
because of higher  rates offered elsewhere, but also because of compa- 
rable accounts at commercial  banks. Deposit losses in 1981  and 1982 
averaged  nearly $3 billion per month  for savings and loan associations 
and  mutual  savings banks  combined.  15  Even on the new ninety-one  day 
certificate, with which thrift institutions  enjoyed a 25-basis point rate 
advantage  until  September  1982,  commercial  banks  have garnered  more 
than  half  the funds. This "quiet  run"  appears  to date  from  the beginning 
of 1981  and has had numerous  consequences. 
The thrift  industry's  cash flow had  deteriorated  to such a great  extent 
by late 1981  that fears were raised about the stability  of the industry. 
The  quiet  run  could  develop  into  a large-scale  flight.  The  Federal  Reserve 
System might be called upon to provide massive amounts  of liquidity. 
But while the problems  have continued,  the process has been orderly. 
14.  Unpublished data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board. 
15.  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board and National  Association  of Mutual Savings 
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Thrift institutions, once the major source of new mortgage  funds, 
have been net sellers of mortgages  for the past few quarters.  Mortgage 
pools assembled by Ginnie  Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie  Mac16  have 
been major  suppliers  of funds, increasing  the amount  of "government- 
related" debt. Furthermore, the lost  deposits at savings and loan 
associations  have been partially  replaced  by advances  from  the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System. These advances, nominally  for "liquidity" 
purposes,  totaled  $67  billion  by mid-1982,17  suggesting  that  government- 
raised  funds are becoming  an important  source of permanent  financing 
for savings and loans. As a result of reduced  mortgage  lending  activity 
and increased borrowing,  savings and loan associations have substan- 
tially improved  their liquidity  from a low point in the first  half of 1981. 
Cash flow plus liquid resources now equal 156 percent of potential 
exposure to cash outflows, compared  with the 112  percent  of 1981,  but 
still below the 201  percent  of early 1980. 
The decline in short-term  rates since midyear is welcome news to 
beleaguered savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks 
because two-thirds of  their deposits have rates tied to  short-term 
Treasury  instruments  or bank CDs."8  Savings and loans had operating 
losses after tax at an annual  rate of $6.6 billion  in the first  half of 1982, 
compared  with $4.6 billion  for all of 1981.19 
In an earlier work I analyzed the earnings outlook for the thrift 
industry under alternative interest rate scenarios.20  At that time I 
expected about 1,100  thrift  disappearances,  roughly  half  of which  would 
be involuntary transactions (supervisory and assisted mergers and 
liquidations) arranged by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation  (FSLIC) and the FDIC. Many of these combinations  will 
require financial assistance from the regulatory agencies to protect 
insured  deposits. The earlier  projections  anticipated  that  the cost of this 
aid would nearly  deplete the insurance  reserves of the FSLIC. 
New projections  confirm  the earlier  results.  Even  the dramatic  decline 
in short-term  interest  rates that has occurred  and that is projected  does 
16.  The  Government  National  Mortgage  Association,  Federal  National  Mortgage 
Association,  and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, respectively. 
17.  About 10 percent of total liabilities. 
18.  Federal Home  Loan Bank Board,  "Savings  and Loan Activity  in June,"  News 
(August 2, 1982), table 1. 
19.  Unpublished data from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
20.  Andrew  S.  Carron,  The Plight  of the Thrift Institutions  (Brookings  Institution, 
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not arrest  the deterioration  in the industry's  net worth.  Operating  losses 
will continue as the average cost of liabilities rises to market levels, 
indicating  a continuation  of involuntary  mergers  with  financial  assistance 
provided by the FSLIC. Implementation  of title II of the Garn-St. 
Germain  Depository Institutions  Act of 1982,  which calls for additional 
expenditures by the FSLIC to ongoing firms, might be expected to 
increase  the costs even further.  But the agency has become increasingly 
resourceful in minimizing  the reported expenses associated with its 
assistance  programs.  The FSLIC  will issue interest-bearing  securities  to 
troubled  institutions  in exchange for income-capital  certificates,  debt- 
equity hybrids  that require  interest (dividend)  and principal  payments 
only if net operating  income is positive. Because these certificates  will 
be carried  by the FSLIC  at book value, the transaction  has no immediate 
effect on the agency's reported condition. The economic cost  has 
increased  but  accounting  costs have  not. It  now  appears  that  no  additional 
resources  will  be required  as long  as interest  rates  do not  rise  substantially 
and  confidence  in the regulators  is maintained. 
Government  agencies have been successful so far in relieving the 
pressures  on the thrift  industry.  There  are  indications,  however, that  the 
limits are being approached  on FSLIC and FDIC merger assistance, 
Federal Home Loan Bank System lending, tax credits, purchase ac- 
counting in supervisory mergers, and the other techniques that have 
been used until now. Without  the decline in short-term  rates, the pace 
and cost  of  thrift institution failures might have overwhelmed the 
administrative,  legal, and financial  capabilities  of the regulatory  agen- 
cies.  In the event of a widespread loss  of confidence in the thrift 
institutions,  the Federal  Reserve  System  would  be called  upon  to provide 
the liquidity to cover withdrawals;  at that point, the Federal Reserve 
would find itself holding  collateral  of low liquidity  and uncertain  value, 
with little prospect  of soon reversing  the transactions.  It may be that  the 
Federal Reserve viewed its choices at midyear  as being  monetary  ease 
then or later. It chose the more orderly  approach,  acting  promptly. 
INTERNATIONAL  LENDING  AND  THE  COMMERCIAL  BANKS 
Conditions in the United States concern other countries as well. 
Developing countries have been particularly  hard hit by the reduced Andrew  S.  Carron  411 
Table 5.  Bank  Debt  of Selected  Developing  Countries,  End of Year  1981 
Billions of dollars 
Total bank debt  Short-term debta 
Country  All banks  U.S.  banks  All banks  U.S.  banks 
Mexico  56.9  21.5  24.0  12.6 
Brazil  52.7  16.8  14.3  7.7 
Argentina  24.8  8.4  9.9  5.2 
South Korea  19.9  8.9  10.6  6.5 
Subtotalb  154.3  55.6  58.8  32.0 
All others  85.5  37.2  56.8  24.0 
Totalb  239.8  92.8  115.6  56.0 
Source:  John  Calverley,  "How  the  Cash  Flow  Crisis  Floored  the  LDCs,"  Eiuromzonev  (August  1982), p.  32; 
Federal Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council,  Statistical  Release  E.16,  "Country Exposure  Lending Survey" 
(June 3,  1982); and author's  estimates. 
a.  Debt  with original maturity of one  year or less. 
b.  Totals  may not add due to rounding. 
demand  for their  exports and  the higher  cost of dollars  needed  to pay for 
imported  oil. These developments have impaired  their ability to make 
scheduled  payments  on outstanding  bank  loans.21  In turn,  this  has raised 
the prospect of a domestic financial  crisis developing  from a default  on 
loans by U.S. banks  to sovereign  borrowers.  Two questions  need to be 
considered:  which debts are large  enough  to cause a major  impact;  and, 
among  those, what are the chances of default? 
A small number  of sovereign borrowers  account for the majority  of 
the outstanding  debt. Among  developing  countries  that  are not major  oil 
exporters, a category that includes Mexico, four nations-Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea-owe  64 percent  of the $240  billion  in 
total bank  debt, as shown in table 5. U.S. banks  are heavily involved in 
this  lending.  They hold  more  than  a third  of the  loans  to nonoil  developing 
countries,  including  the four  large  borrowers  just mentioned. 
U.S.  banks play a much smaller role in loans to Eastern Europe, 
where  Poland,  the U.S.S.R., East Germany,  and Hungary  are  the major 
borrowers.  The external  bank  debt  of the Eastern  Bloc is only $71  billion, 
and U.S. banks hold only a small fraction  of the total. So, despite the 
well-known problems in Poland, U.S.  bank exposure to major risks 
appears  confined  to the developing  countries  just mentioned. 
21.  Robert Solomon,  "Is a Debt Crisis Likely?"  International Economic  Letter, vol. 
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How well, then, are these countries coping with their debt? An 
indication can be gained from comparing  export earnings with debt 
service. And whatever conclusions are to be drawn must also take 
account  of recent  policy actions  that  will  improve  or  worsen  the situation. 
South Korea's debt does not appear  to be a problem.  That  nation  has 
a growing  economy with substantial  export earnings,  and  it now enjoys 
a credit rating  rivaling  the most favored sovereign borrowers.  Recent 
loans  to Korea  have carried  interest  rates  slightly  lower  than  the average 
for OECD  borrowers. 
The three large Latin American nations clearly present the major 
problems, both for international  bank lending  in particular  and for the 
financial  system in general.  Mexico appears  to be the biggest  problem  at 
the moment,  but Brazil  and  Argentina  also have difficulties  and  together 
their  debt to U.S. banks  exceeds that of Mexico. 
The risks in Mexico were thought  to be low because that country  is 
an  oil exporter.  This source  of strength  faded  with  declines  in  the demand 
for and price of oil. Its trade deficit grew, inflation  increased, and the 
currency  was devalued.  Mexico's interest  payment  burden  was  projected 
to be a high  34 percent  of exports  in 1982,  with  principal  payments  equal 
to 85 percent  of exports  falling  due also.22  By late 1981,  lenders  began  to 
demand higher interest rates. Eurodollar  loans to Mexican sovereign 
borrowers  carried  a premium  of 0.5 percentage  point over the London 
Interbank  Offered  Rate (LIBOR)  early  in 1981,  but the rate  increased  to 
1.5 points over LIBOR  for the last new loans negotiated  in 1982:2  (see 
figure  1). The few small  medium-term  credits  issued in the third  quarter 
carried  premiums  of 2 points over LIBOR. Finally, the government  of 
Mexico announced  that it would be unable  to make timely payment  of 
interest and principal on the outstanding bank loans, and it sought 
assistance  from  the U.S. government  and  international  agencies. 
A major  concern has been the effect of the Mexican  problems  on the 
U.S. banks that hold $22 billion of those loans. Even if most or all the 
loans will ultimately  be repaid, their present discounted value will be 
reduced, but by amounts  that cannot be calculated  with precision. The 
amounts  will depend on current  account dynamics,  the amount  of new 
infusions  of capital  and  maturity  extensions required,  and  actions  by the 
oil-exporting  cartel. This uncertainty  is a major  part of the problem. 
22.  Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, World  Financial Markets (August 
1982), p. 10. Figure 1. Average Loan Rate Spreads over LIBOR, Selected Countries, 1979:1 
through 1982:2 
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Table 6.  U.S. Bank Exposure to the External Debt Problems of Mexico, 
End of Year 1981 
Amount  Total  Amount 
owed  capital  owed as  Capital 
to bankb  of bankc  share of  as share 
(billions  (billions  capital  of assets 
Banka  of dollars)  of dollars)  (percent)  (percent) 
Manufacturers Hanover  1.4  2.3  61  4.2 
Bank of America  2.5  4.6  54  3.9 
First Chicago  0.6  1.3  46  4.0 
Bankers Trust  0.7  1.6  44  4.7 
Chemical Bank  1.0  2.2  45  4.8 
Citibank  2.3  5.3  43  5.1 
Chase  Manhattan  1.6  4.2  38  5.5 
Morgan Guaranty  0.9  2.6  35  4.9 
Continental Illinois  0.6  2.0  30  4.5 
All reporting banks 
Nine  money  center  banks  11.8  26.1  45  4.6 
Fifteen  other large banksd  4.4  12.2  36  5.2 
All other reporting banks  5.6  24.4  23  6.7 
Total of all reporting banks  21.8  62.7  35  5.4 
Sources:  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council,  Statistical  Release  E.16  for all data except  that on 
loans  of  individual  money  center  banks,  which  are author's  estimates  based  on  "Worry at the  World's  Banks," 
Biusiness Week (September  6,  1982), p. 82. 
a.  Banks  listed in order of decreasing  loan-to-capital  ratio. 
b.  Total  amounts  owed  U.S.  banks  by  Mexican  borrowers  (except  peso  loans) after adjustments  for guarantees 
and external  borrowing. 
c.  Equity  capital,  subordinated notes,  and reserves. 
d.  First National  Bank of Boston,  Marine Midland Bank, The Bank of New  York, Irving Trust Company,  Mellon 
Bank,  National  Bank of Detroit,  First National  Bank in Dallas,  Republic Bank Dallas,  First City National  Bank of 
Houston,  Security  Pacific National  Bank,  First Interstate  Bank of California, Crocker National  Bank,  Wells  Fargo 
Bank,  Seattle-First  National  Bank,  and Texas  Commerce  Bank. 
Bankers  and  regulators  fear the indirect  effects of the Mexican  situation 
on depositor confidence and regulatory  standards.  If buyers of jumbo 
CDs shun certain banks, the ensuing liquidity  shortage  would call for 
intervention  by the Federal  Reserve. And classification  of the Mexican 
loans as nonperforming  could subject some banks  to increased  govern- 
ment  supervision  and  restrictions  on their  activities. Formal  declaration 
of default  could reduce the capital  of a few banks  below the regulatory 
minimum. 
The exposure and condition of U.S. banks is shown in table 6. For 
the nine money center banks, the outstanding  Mexican  loans are equal 
to 45  percent  of capital.  The average  for other  U.S. banks  is considerably 
lower. Even if the write-downs  on Mexican loans are relatively small, Andrew S.  Carron  415 
when added to the losses experienced by several banks on domestic 
loans a substantial  share of capital  is seen to be at risk. Once capital  is 
exhausted,  losses fall on uninsured  creditors  including  holders  ofjumbo 
CDs. It is this possibility that concerns investors and bankers.  A few 
large banks with large Mexican exposures are now paying premiums 
over the CD rates paid by money center banks that are less heavily 
involved  in international  lending.  Moreover,  Mexico  is not the only large 
sovereign  borrower  in trouble. 
Brazil's  interest  burden  exceeds one-third  of its total  export  earnings, 
and amortization  payments  are an equally large  amount,  the highest  of 
all countries under consideration.23  Oil imports  and depressed export 
markets  are primarily  to blame. Yet that  nation,  through  tight  monetary 
policy, has slowed imports to create a trade surplus  and moderate  its 
current  account deficit. If this effort continues, despite the social and 
political difficulties  that it creates in Brazil, no crisis is anticipated.24 
Nonetheless, lenders have demanded  stiff premiums  for new Brazilian 
credits. Several new loans this year carried  a spread  of 2A  percentage 
points  over LIBOR,  a penalty  higher  than  that  demanded  of all but  a few 
very  poor  nations.25  If a default  did  occur, however, it could  have serious 
implications  for U.S. banks. The U.S. bank  debt of Brazil  is equal  to 39 
percent of the net worth of the twenty-four  largest U.S. banks. Even 
though  the holdings of Brazilian  debt are not so heavily concentrated 
as holdings  of Mexican  debt, some banks  could have serious  difficulties 
in the event of a default. 
Argentina's  external debt is half that of Brazil or Mexico, and until 
recently  its export earnings  represented  greater  interest  coverage than 
either  of these two. The Falkland  Islands conflict injected  great  uncer- 
tainty into the Argentine economy, reducing  exports, depressing  the 
currency,  and  raising  the import  bill  for such items as weapons  and  fuel. 
Few new loans have been made to  Argentine government-backed 
borrowers  since the crisis, so it is unclear what probabilities  lenders 
place on a moratorium  or default. Spreads  have increased  sharply  from 
0.6 percentage  point over LIBOR in 1981:2  to 1.2 points premium  in 
23. Ibid. 
24. Lawrence  B. Krause, "International  Economic  Comment:  Debts of Developing 
Countries  and their Impact on the World Economy," Economic Research (Goldman 
Sachs,  December  4, 1981),  pp. 1-6; and  Solomon, "Is a Debt  Crisis  Likely?"  pp. 7-9. 
25. Unpublished  data  from  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company. 416  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
1982:2.  A rescheduling  of Argentina's  debt appears quite likely. The 
risks are substantial  in Argentina  but the exposure is the smallest  of the 
major  borrowers. 
Thus far commercial banks are weathering  the current adversity. 
Deposit flows are healthy, with retail  deposits at banks  growing  faster  in 
1982 than even money market mutual fund shares.26  Nonperforming 
assets at major  banks have increased to 2.2 percent of total loans and 
nonperforming  real estate this year, from 1.8 percent in 1981  and 1.5 
percent in 1980.27  Continental  Illinois National Bank has stated that its 
nonperforming  loans are  now at 5.7 percent  of assets.28  Otherwise,  these 
levels are still below the 5 percent or more of assets represented  by 
nonperforming  loans in the aftermath  of the 1974-75  recession.29 
Another measure of the problems of the commercial  banks can be 
found in the interest rate spreads on large CDs. Although rates have 
been quite volatile, the spread  between CDs and  Treasury  bills hovered 
in the range of 50 basis points for much of the last year. In July, the 
spread  began to widen as Treasury  rates led the market  downward.  By 
mid-August,  concerns over pressures  on the banking  sector led initially 
to a rise in the CD rates  as the Treasury  bill  rate  continued  to drop.  With 
further  declines in both rates through  late August, the spread  reached 
nearly 200 basis points-above  earlier  levels (27 basis points average 
over 1975-79) but still below the spreads recorded after the Franklin 
National  Bank  failure  in 1974  (see table  7). By mid-September,  however, 
the spread was around 250 basis points-comparable to the 1974-75 
recession. Investor uncertainty  is affecting all banks, even as some 
distinctions are being made on the basis of exposure to international 
risks. So there  are  indications  of crisis  conditions  among  the commercial 
banks. 
ROLE  OF  THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE 
The Federal  Reserve has been seen to play two roles in the develop- 
ment  and  resolution  of financial  market  difficulties.  As an  inflation  fighter 
it has the power to induce stresses in the real sector that can lead to 
26.  Federal Reserve Statistical  Release  H.6,  p. 4. 
27.  Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. 
28.  New  York  Times, October 15, 1982. 
29. "Credit  Difficulties,"  pp. 1-2. Andrew  S.  Carron  417 
Table 7.  Interest  Rate  Spreads  on Bank  Certificates  of Deposit,  Selected  Periods, 




Bank three-month  Treasury 
Period  jumbo  CD rate  bill yieldb  Spread 
Last month of quarter 
1974:1  8.84  8.49  0.35 
2  11.38  8.43  2.95 
3  11.60  8.61  2.99 
4  9.23  7.59  1.64 
1975-79  7.36  7.09  0.27 
1980:1  17.57  17.02  0.55 
2  8.49  7.50  0.99 
3  11.29  11.13  0.16 
4  18.65  17.38  1.27 
1981:1  14.43  14.77  -0.34 
2  16.90  16.44  0.46 
3  16.84  16.40  0.44 
4  12.49  11.80  0.69 
1982:1  14.21  13.96  0.25 
2  14.46  13.71  0.75 
3  10.66  8.45  2.21 
Week ending 
July 
2  15.21  14.11  1.10 
9  14.80  13.32  1.48 
16  13.96  12.81  1.15 
23  12.58  11.56  1.02 
30  12.01  11.40  0.61 
August 
6  11.43  10.58  0.85 
13  11.63  10.47  1.16 
20  9.77  8.40  1.37 
27  9.73  7.97  1.76 
September 
3  10.42  8.89  1.53 
10  10.58  8.92  1.66 
17  10.94  8.57  2.37 
24  10.73  8.01  2.72 
October 
1  10.43  8.00  2.43 
Source:  Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System. 
a.  Averages  of daily rates,  secondary  market. 
b.  Discount  rate converted  to investment  yield. 418  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
financial  crises. As central  banker  the Board  can prevent  the illiquidity 
and restore the lost confidence that come with a crisis. These two 
activities  may  at times be inconsistent  with  each other.  That  is more  true 
now than it was before innovation demolished many of the barriers 
between  financial  markets  and institutions. 
The task of the Federal Reserve is to balance  these roles. Until this 
summer, monetary restraint  took precedence and a financial  crunch 
ensued. From the Federal Reserve's point of view, this was entirely 
appropriate  as long as there was no crisis. But then came the first  signs 
of a developing crisis-widening  corporate  bond spreads, the possible 
collapse of the thrift  industry,  and tremors  in the international  banking 
system. 
Nearly  every measure  developed  here suggests  a crisis  in the financial 
sector. The magnitude  of the distress  is roughly  comparable  to the 1974- 
75 recession, although  some parts  of the system are in a better  condition 
than  they were  during  the earlier  episode  while  others  are  worse. Failures 
among  the manufacturing,  banking,  and  thrift  industries  are  substantially 
above postwar  peaks. On the other  hand,  nonperforming  loans at banks 
and  the excess premiums  paid  by banks  for CDs are  at levels below those 
of 1974-75. 
The 1974-75 recession exposed the financial system to enormous 
strains. Many observers believed that the eventual recovery was quite 
fortuitous. That earlier  experience may indicate the limit to which the 
system can safely be pressed. It may be inferred  that the warning  signs 
observed  in  mid-  1982  induced  the  Board  to revise  its stance.  This  suggests 
that the Federal  Reserve views the efficiency  of the financial  system as 
its primary  responsibility-its role as central  banker. 
This is good news for those who fear the consequences  of a financial 
crisis  per se or who view the misallocations  that  result  as too high  a price 
to pay for the possible further  moderation  of inflation.  It appears  that 
monetary  policy has been controlled  so as to force the economy through 
a financial  crunch  into the early stages of a crisis. But that  is as far  as the 
Federal  Reserve seems willing  to go. Comments 
and Discussion 
Benjamin M. Friedman: I found the parts of Andrew  Carron's  paper 
that explained and documented  what has been happening  much more 
helpful  than the attempts  to develop categories  for different  degrees of 
financial  problems  and  thereby  to define  a "financial  crisis." I doubt  that 
we will ever be able to draw such distinctions  well. Carron  makes as 
good an attempt  as I have seen, but still the resulting  definitions  are not 
very satisfying. 
I would like to discuss some of the paper's  conclusions. I agree  with 
Carron that the higher-risk  premiums that we  have seen on risky 
securities  in the financial  markets  to date have had  to do almost  entirely 
with the discounting of risks associated with real phenomena. The 
markets  are now realizing  that our economy is simply  not going  to have 
a typical vigorous recovery from the current  recession, and moreover 
that  unemployed  workers  are not the only economic actors  to be hurt  in 
such a situation. 
There  was a long period  during  which  participants  in the market  were 
apparently  able to persuade  themselves  either  that  disinflation  was going 
to be costless or that the only people who had to pay the costs were on 
the unemployment  line. That view is now disappearing,  and market 
participants  are starting  to understand  something  that Carron's  paper 
brings out well: if the economy has a recession like the current  one, 
which  has been the worst yet in the postwar  period  from  the perspective 
of business profits, and then does not follow it with a strong  recovery, 
the resulting  situation  is ruinous  for many  firms. 
Carron  has documented  the position of the thrift  industry  very well, 
and he has identified  the basic problem:  the FSLIC  just does not have 
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enough capital to keep the thrift industry operating  with its current 
structure  intact. 
I would therefore  urge that bank mergers  with thrift  institutions  be 
more actively encouraged  as a way out of the present problems  of the 
thrifts.  The banking  system provides  an obvious pool of capital  for this 
purpose. For banks want to enter diverse markets, especially across 
state  lines, and  it seems entirely  in  order  to let them  pay  for  that  relaxation 
of currently  prevailing  restrictions. The way to let the banks do so is 
through assumptions of essentially failed thrift institutions. I see no 
reason to put the taypayers' money into saving the thrift institutions 
when banks  are willing  to put in their  capital  instead. 
Finally, Carron  appears  more concerned than I would be about the 
prospect that banks with foreign loans would have to take losses on 
these loans. To some degree the banks have put themselves in this 
situation. Those banks that are at greatest risk are the ones that have 
been the most aggressive  in asserting  that these loans were not risky. In 
fact they were risky. These banks  have not been putting  aside adequate 
loan loss reserves and  therefore  have been overstating  their  earnings  for 
years. 
In some cases, it almost appears  to be a deliberate  policy on some 
banks'  part  to buy enough  high-risk  loans to convert  them  into zero-risk 
loans by creating  a position in which the U.S. government  will have to 
bail  them out in the end. 
My conclusion  is that, although  a situation  in which  banks  fail should 
and can be avoided, we should not be determined  to avoid losses to 
shareholders  in banks that have pursued  such policies. If some of these 
loans were written  down as nonperforming,  and banks  therefore  had to 
raise new capital at low equity prices, that would only reflect the true 
result  of the lending  policies they have chosen. 
General Discussion 
Robert  Hall  elaborated  on the paper'  s analysis  of money  market  funds 
by pointing  out their significant  advantage  compared  with commercial 
banks in terms of financial  crisis risks. According  to Hall, the banking 
system is especially prone to crises because banks give depositors a 
face-value claim rather than an equity claim on the banks' assets. If 
banks  gave equity  claims, as funds  do, there  could be no question  of the Andrew S.  Carron  421 
banks failing or become illiquid because of  a few  problem loans. 
Depositors would find that the value of their claims had declined as a 
result of the problems, but would have no temptation  to withdraw  all 
their  assets immediately.  Jeffrey Sachs replied  that, even though  bank 
failures as such would not be a problem, the system of international 
lending might not be more stable if depositors had equity stakes. He 
observed  that  the  last  great  crisis  in international  credit  markets  occurred 
in 1931  when banks  did not play a central  role. Almost  all  foreign  lending 
in that era was in the form of bonds, an asset much closer to current 
money market  holdings  than to bank  deposits. Sachs argued  that insti- 
tutional  bank lending in the international  market  has greatly  enhanced 
the efficiency  of international  lending  because, in the present  era, banks 
can flexibly  negotiate  with creditors  to reschedule  debt payments.  Debt 
rescheduling  is sometimes tantamount  to partial  default, but is far less 
disruptive  than the formal  defaults  and unilateral  debt moratoria  which 
were so common before 1930. James Tobin added that the present 
arrangement,  at least since its reform  in 1935,  has not done that badly. 
It seems to perform  well in the allocation  of risk  and  maturity  preference 
and in providing intermediation.  Through this process banks create 
liquidity and safety that depositors want and need and that would be 
absent in a world of nothing  but funds in which depositors  are  forced to 
bear  equity risks. 
Robert Solomon strongly  disagreed  with the suggestion  in Benjamin 
Friedman's comment that large commercial  banks with international 
problem  loans should  be compelled  to pay all the losses associated  with 
these loans. He disagreed  with  Friedman's  premise  that  these loans  were 
reckless, and argued  instead that most of the present  problem  is attrib- 
utable to unprecedentedly  high real interest rates and the recession in 
the industrial  countries-factors not under  the control  of either  the large 
banks  or their  LDC customers  and  developments  that  were well beyond 
the range  of normal  expectations. He also argued  that, if the large  banks 
were compelled to reduce their  international  lending,  the impact  on the 
less developed countries  and, in turn,  on the industrial  countries,  would 
be severe. 
Peter Kenen expanded  on the current  risk of a country  defaulting  in 
the international  credit market.  He argued  that  the risk  of full default  is 
quite small and that debt reschedulings  do not normally  affect the net 
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as "nonperforming"  for fear of adversely affecting  the banks'  capacity 
to participate  in debt reschedulings. Kenen also remarked  that banks 
currently  have a great deal of indirect  exposure to international  risks. 
Banks  that  have not directly  lent to Mexico or Poland,  for example,  may 
be indirectly  affected by those countries'  problems  because of loans to 
banks in third  countries that in turn  have supplied  credit to Mexico or 
Poland. 